Real cryptography, working today: the Tamga first release

We built the system a university would actually use, then ran it on invented students. Everything cryptographic is real; only the people and some operational pieces are not.

What runs today

• A university issues a diploma or student card into the wallet — ten copies, each bound to a different device key.
• An employer asks for two fields and gets exactly those two, verified in seconds.
• A revocation reaches every verifier at the next fixed publication; suspending a university stops new issuance while earlier diplomas stay valid.
• A screenshot of a credential is rejected; so is a copy presented with another phone’s key.
• An identity check produces an identity credential, also as an ISO mdoc: an age check receives only “over 18”.
• Campus turnstiles and event gates accept a 60-second QR pass; a ticket works once.
• A website signs a person up with the wallet, then lets them in every day with a passkey.

What is still a shortcut

Every shortcut is recorded in a public deviation log and closes before the pilot: the student records are samples, keys live in software rather than the phone’s secure chip, the university’s signing key is held by Tamga, the wallet provider does not accept the app’s own statement about its platform (every wallet counts as software-level; with the App Store and Google Play release, App Attest / Play Integrity become mandatory), and there is a single operator. The website sign-in still uses one account value across sites at sign-up; a per-site pseudonym is on the roadmap.

Why say all this

Because trust infrastructure that hides its limits is not trustworthy. The side-by-side with the EU architecture — same, bridged, planned — is in Tamga and the EUDI architecture; the plan is in the whitepaper.